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I. INTRODUCTION
The Problem: Compulsory Collection and Retention of DNA Upon Arrest
The following scenario, though a hypothetical, could be happening all over
the United States because of the current DNA Act. John is arrested by the township
police department on a burglary charge. Upon arrest, the police obtain a sample of
John’s DNA using a buccal swab. John does not give his consent for the sample nor
do police obtain a warrant from the local magistrate. The charges against John are
later dropped. John’s DNA profile is entered into the local DNA database and also
entered into CODIS, the federal DNA database. John is unaware his DNA was kept.
He never writes to have his profile expunged from the record. A few years later
there is a murder in John’s town. Federal officials are called in to investigate the
murder. The federal agents obtain DNA from the crime scene. The DNA sample is
entered into the national database and alerts officials that John’s sample is a partial
match. Officials now know that the person who committed the murder is a male
relative of John. Police go to John’s town and use the partial match as probable
cause to arrest all of John’s male relatives in the area. Using the authority of the
federal DNA Act, the federal agents obtain compulsory DNA samples of all the male
relatives upon their arrest for the murder. John’s cousin, Mark, is a direct match.
Mark is charged with the murder.1
Some people may read the preceding hypothetical and think, “Great, police
were able to solve that murder.” But others will read that scenario and shudder

DNA and Law Enforcement; Karen J. Maschke; 2-3; published by the Hastings
Center
1
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because the DNA Act and the compulsory collection and retention of DNA from
arrested individuals bypasses the protections of the Fourth Amendment and reeks
of an unconstitutional search and seizure.

DNA Databases
The United States currently has the largest DNA database in the world.2 Until
a few years ago, the United Kingdom had the largest. As of 2012, 53 countries have
established DNA databases.3 Six countries have enacted legislation establishing
DNA databases.4 Three countries are considering legislation to establish DNA
databases. Thirty-five countries are in the process of planning DNA databases.5 The
United Arab Emirates is in the process of putting the entire population into a DNA
database.6 In 2008, Uzbekistan declared it would put its entire population into a
DNA database.7 US intelligence is currently building DNA databases in Afghanistan
and Iraq.8 Bermuda has been entering DNA profiles into its national database since
2005, including the profiles of innocent people.9 In Argentina, families whose
children went missing during the dictatorship have been voluntarily giving DNA
samples to the national database.10 Based on the statistics, it is clear that DNA
profiling is here to stay.

Gene Watch UK; www.genewatch.org
Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
2
3
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II. Current DNA Collection and Retention Policies
The United States
DNA profiling has become so popular because it is a simple and accurate method
for identification. In the United States, DNA profiling was first used to convict a
criminal defendant in 1987 when forensic scientist recovered a DNA sample from a
Florida rape victim to the DNA of the suspect.11
Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135
in 2000. The statute authorized federal officials to collect DNA samples from people
convicted of specific violent crimes who were in federal custody, including
probationers, parolees, and people on supervised release. In 2004 Congress passed
the Justice for All Act, which expanded DNA collection to any person convicted of
any federal felony. Congress further expanded DNA legislation with the passage of
the Violence Against Women Act of 2006 and the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety
Act of 2006. These acts permit federal officials to obtain DNA from any person
arrested for a federal felony and federal detainees who are neither US citizens nor
permanent resident aliens.12

Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued
Seizure Under the DNA Act, Natalie Logan; page 2
12 DNA and Law Enforcement; Karen J. Maschke; 2-3; published by the Hastings
Center
11
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On July 27, 2006 the new amendments to 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a became
effective.13 The amendments authorized DNA samples to be collected “from
individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted or from non-United States
persons who are detained under the authority of the United States.”14 The statute
states that “any felony” is any qualifying federal offense for purposes of the Act.15
The Act proscribes a criminal penalty for individuals who fail to cooperate in the
collection of samples – failure to comply will result in the individual being guilty of a
Class A misdemeanor and punished in accordance with Title 18.16
The DNA Act requires the Attorney General, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or the corresponding probation office to give every DNA sample taken
pursuant to (a) to the Director of the FBI. The FBI will then analyze each sample and
create a DNA profile.17 State and federal agencies submit locally analyzed DNA
profiles to the National DNA Index System (NDIS). The FBI uses its software
program, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) to link the profiles already
contained in the state and federal databases.18
There are safeguards built into the statute and government policies that protect
the genetic information and limit the reach of the Act. First, the Act requires the
Director of the FBI to expunge the DNA record from CODIS when a conviction is
overturned or when, if the sample is taken following an arrest, the charge is
42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a)
42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a)(1)(A)
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(d)(1)
16 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(a)(5)(A) and (B)
13
14

42 U.S.C.A. § 14135(b)
Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued
Seizure Under the DNA Act, Natalie Logan; page 3
17
18
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dismissed or results in an acquittal or no charge is timely filed.19 In order for the
FBI to expunge the record, the individual must send a certified copy of the final
court order establishing the final disposition of the arrest or conviction.20
There are two additional government policies that are not explicitly part of the
statute but are important in protecting against the misuse of information. First,
there are no names or other personal identifiers stored in CODIS. The database
contains only the DNA profile, a number identifying the agency that submitted the
DNA profile, a “Specimen Identification Number” (a number the FBI assigned
sequentially at the time the sample is collected that does not correspond in any way
to the individual’s social security number, criminal history identifier, or correctional
facility identifier), and information identifying the laboratory personnel associated
with creating the profile.21 The end result is that a CODIS user can only access a
very limited amount of data, none of which can be used to identify the source of the
DNA profile.22
Second, the FBI has established a policy of using only “junk DNA.” Junk DNA
refers to “non-genic stretches of DNA not presently recognized as being responsible
for trait coding.”23 The strict practice of analyzing and storing only “junk DNA”

42 U.S.C.A. § 14135
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011); 42 U.S.C.A. §
14135(d)(1)(A)
21 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
22 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011)
23 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality
opinion)
19

20United

7

guarantees that important personal genetic information that reveals physical
characteristics and medical conditions is not stored in CODIS.24
Compulsory DNA Collection and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”25 A
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government infringes upon an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.26 “It is
undisputed that a compelled DNA extraction is a “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes.”27 “The compulsory extraction of blood for DNA profiling unquestionably
implicates the right to personal security embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and
thus constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Constitution.”28
Compulsory DNA collection pursuant to the Act implicates the Fourth
Amendment in three different ways.29 First, the collection of the sample is a search
of the person.30 Law enforcement can take DNA be using a blood sample or buccal
swab of the interior of the individual’s cheek.31 Although this is a minimal intrusion,
the Supreme Court has recognized that even minimal intrusions implicate the
United States v. Mitchell, at 400
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4
26 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4
27 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012)
28 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
24
25

29Skinner

v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 612 (1989)
Id.
31 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010)
30
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Fourth Amendment.32 Second, the collection of the sample is a seizure of the
individual’s bodily tissues.33 Third, the analysis of the sample is a second, separate
search.34 The federal Circuit Courts have “unanimously upheld the analysis of DNA
samples as searches for Fourth Amendment purposes” but have declined to find the
analysis unreasonable.35
Currently, the majority of United States Circuit Courts views the collection of
DNA as parallel to the collection of a fingerprint and have held the compulsory
collection and retention of DNA upon arrest does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The majority view is to analyze the constitutionality of the Act using a
reasonableness approach: whether the intrusion is reasonable.36 The courts apply
a totality of circumstances test, “balancing the intrusion on an arrestee’s privacy
against the Government’s interest in the collection and testing of his DNA.”37 For
example, in Mitchell, the Third Circuit weighed the minimal intrusion of the buccal
swab combined with an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy in his identity
against “the protections built into the Act, the Government’s stated practice of only
analyzing ‘junk DNA’, the current limits of technology, the information stored served
only an identification purpose, the DNA served important law enforcement interests
which were not equally well served by collecting DNA samples post conviction” and

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1989)
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004)
34 Skinner v. United States, 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 1402, 616 (1989)
35 Logan, page 12
36 Haskell v. Harris (9th Cir.) (Analyzing CA statute comparable to DNA Act); United
States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3rd Cir. 2011)
37 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387
32
33
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determined the intrusion was reasonable and therefore not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.38
The FBI’s policy of using only “junk DNA” ensures that the CODIS DNA profiles
can only be used for identification. In Mitchell, the Third Circuit found “the use of
“junk DNA” creates a “DNA fingerprint” that yields precise information about
identity but little or no other personal information.”39 The D.C. Circuit Court
determined that because junk DNA is useful for only identification purposes, “CODIS
functions much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database (albeit more
efficiently).”40 See also Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2010), stating
that, “Given the DNA Act’s stringent limitations on the creation and use of DNA
profiles, CODIS currently functions much like a traditional fingerprint database,
permitting law enforcement to match one identification record against others
contained in the database.”41 Both the Second and Tenth Circuits also determined
the DNA Act’s restrictions and FBI’s use of junk DNA in CODIS permit the
government to use a suspect’s DNA in essentially the same way the government uses
fingerprints and photographs to identify suspects and solve past and future
crimes.42 Because courts view DNA profiles as analogous to fingerprint records,
courts treat the intrusion of privacy under the DNA Act to be similar to the intrusion
caused by the retention of fingerprint records.43
Id.
United States v. Mitchell, at 401
40 Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 499 (D.C.Cir.2006)
41 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2010)
42 Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir.2007)
43 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir.2005)
38
39
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DNA Retention and the Fourth Amendment
DNA Retention Not an Unreasonable Search
Currently, the United States Supreme Court has not faced the question as to
whether the retention of DNA samples or profiles is a constitutional violation.
Boroian v. Mueller, a First Circuit decision, was the first decision regarding the
government’s retention of the sample in CODIS.44 In Boroian, the First Circuit held
the government’s retention of Boroian’s (a former probationer) blood sample and
DNA profile pursuant to the DNA Act did not constitute a separate “search” in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court based its decision on the fact that the
matching process used by CODIS was not a new search because it was limited to a
comparison of the identification records already in the government’s lawful
possession. Furthermore, subsequent CODIS searches for matches did not reveal
any new private information about Boroian or intrude in any way on his reasonable
expectations of privacy. Therefore, the subsequent searches were not treated as
new “searches” for Fourth Amendment purposes.45
The federal courts’ treatment of DNA profiles as analogous to fingerprints (for
identification purposes only) lead the First Circuit to determine that DNA profiles
fall under the 28 U.S.C. § 534(a), which requires the Attorney General to “acquire,
collect, classify, and preserve” criminal identification records.46 The government is
not required to expunge the records, except for in very limited circumstances. (“It is

Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights and Continued
Seizure Under the DNA Act; Natalie Logan, 2012, Trustees of Boston University;
Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.)
45 Id.
46 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d at 67
44
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well established that the state need not destroy records of identification – such as
fingerprints, photographs, etc. – of convicted felons, once their sentences are up.”)47
DNA Retention: Question of Continued Seizure
Boroian’s claim, that the retention of his DNA sample was an unreasonable
search, failed.48 However, on his appeal to the First Circuit, Boroian attempted to
raise the allegation that the DNA Act was unconstitutional because it constituted a
continued seizure, and was thus an unreasonable search.49 The United States
Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of continuing seizure in United States v.
Place. The Court determined that a seizure of personal property could be
reasonable on the onset but the continuing seizure could become unreasonable
because of the length of time the property was held for.50 However, when Boroian’s
case reach the First Circuit on appeal, the Court refused to address the new
complaint because Boroian had failed to raise the issue on his appeal to the lower
court. 51
The Continuous Seizure Doctrine is relevant to the DNA Act because it raises
the important (and as yet unanswered question) of whether a person retains a
possessory interest in his DNA after it has been taken by the government, profile,
and entered into CODIS to be used in future DNA searches.52 The Supreme Court
has not addressed the question of whether a person retains a possessory interest in

United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007)
Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60
49 Boroian v. Mueller, supra
50 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2639, 77 L.Ed. 2d 110
(1983)
51 Boroian v. Mueller, supra
52 Logan, page 748 - 749
47
48
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his DNA sample once it has been collected.53 However, the leading state court case
in possessory rights of biological matter, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, held that a person does not retain a property right in human tissue and
biological matter that has been removed from his body.54 Based on this decision, as
well as the current trend in treating DNA samples and profiles on CODIS as
comparable to a fingerprint database, my guess would be there would be no claim
for maintaining a possessory interest in the blood or buccal swab that was removed
from the body and used to create the DNA profile.

DNA Collection Has No Fifth Amendment Implications
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a person
will not “be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”55 The
compulsory collection of DNA samples does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.
When a person is compelled to give a DNA sample, the sample is collected either
through blood or a buccal swab of the inner cheek of the suspect (to collect saliva).
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court ruled that physical
characteristics are not subject to the self-incrimination clause and therefore the
compulsory taking of the defendant’s blood was not a violation of the Fifth
Amendment.56 The Court has developed this concept over the years and ruled there
are a number of situations where defendants and suspects are forced to provide
physical information and there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Pennsylvania
v. Muniz, holding defendant’s answers to officers’ questions pursuant to a DUI stop
Logan, page 749
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990)
55 U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5
56 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.D. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966)
53
54
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prior to being given his Miranda warnings were admissible because slurred speech
was a physical characteristic of the defendant and not “testimonial” and therefore
not protected by the Fifth Amendment.57 See also Gilbert v. California, holding a
mere handwriting sample (as opposed to the content of what is written), is like the
voice or body itself, an identifying physical characteristic, and not subject to
constitutional protection.58 Based on the case law, the DNA Act relates to physical
characteristics and therefore is entirely constitutional under the Fifth Amendment.

Current Status of the DNA Act in the US
Every United States Circuit Court that has addressed the constitutionality of
the DNA Act as applied to arrestees not yet convicted has upheld the Act as
constitutional. However, on April 24, 2012 the Maryland Court of Appeals
overturned the 2010 conviction and life sentence of Alonzo Jay King. King had been
arrested for an assault in 2009. Upon his arrest, authorities took a DNA sample
pursuant to a Maryland state law permitting police to obtain DNA samples from
people arrested for violent crimes, attempted violent crimes, burglary, and
attempted burglary. The DNA sample linked King to a rape that had gone unsolved
for seven years. The Maryland Court of Appeals held Maryland’s DNA Collection Act
was a violation to the Fourth Amendment because it constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure.59
Maryland applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. On
November 9, 2012 the High Court granted certiorari to determine whether a state
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990)
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)
59 “Supreme Court Takes Up DNA and Sentencing Cases” MSNBC; 11/09/2012;
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/49765575/ns/us_news
57
58
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may collect DNA samples from arrestees not yet convicted of violent crimes. Chief
Justice Roberts noted the Maryland Court’s decision conflicts with three other
appellate courts that upheld DNA laws similar to Maryland’s. Roberts said
Maryland’s decision “had national implications” because if the Maryland decision
was upheld the FBI could not get Maryland arrestees’ samples for CODIS.60

Council Of Europe Member States
Introduction
The United Kingdom was the first European country to establish a national DNA
database. Currently, most of the Council of Europe member States have established
databases and permit the compulsory collection of DNA in the criminal context.
Twenty-five States have provisions permitting the collection of DNA samples to be
stored as a profile on a DNA database (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden).61
DNA policies in the member States vary. Most countries do not permit automatic
DNA collection in criminal proceedings but restrict sampling and profiling to
specific circumstances, such as arrests for serious offenses or crimes punishable by
certain prison terms (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Sweden).62 Five
Id.
Gene Watch UK; Summary by Region: Europe; http://www.genewatch.org/sub568625; accessed 10/26/2012
62 http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgments.pdf
60
61
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countries (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Sweden) permit DNA samples to be
obtained and profiles entered into the national database but require that the
information be destroyed pursuant to a government order if the person is acquitted
or criminal proceedings are not pursued.63
Some countries permit retention for a limited time or for limited purposes. For
example, Austria and Poland allow DNA profiles to be kept if there is a real risk the
individual will commit a future dangerous offense.64 Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands authorize retention if the police continue to suspect the person or if the
person is implicated in a separate criminal investigation.65 While the UK is the only
member State that once permitted indefinite retention, France has a very expansive
retention policy: profiles can be kept for 25 years after the person is acquitted or
charges dismissed.66 However, during the retention period the prosecutor can
order the profile be deleted (either on his own or upon request) if the DNA is no
longer required for identification in a criminal prosecution.67 Finland permits
retention for one year after a person is acquittal.68 Denmark law authorizes profile
retention for 10 years after an acquittal.69 Switzerland permits DNA to be kept for 1
year after criminal proceedings are discontinued.70

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgments.pdf
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
63
64
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Italy has a very restrictive DNA policy. In June 2009 Italy passed legislation
establishing a database for convicted offenders only. To obtain a DNA sample from
a suspect, a judge must request the person’s profile.71

The United Kingdom
Until recently, the United Kingdom had the largest DNA database in the world.
The database, officially titled the UK National Criminal Intelligence DNA Database
(NDNAD), was established in 1995. By March 2012 the database contained about
5,950,612 individual profiles. Approximately 30,000 new profiles are added to the
database each month. The DNA samples are taken from crime scenes, police
suspects, and, in England and Wales, from anyone arrested and detained at a police
station. The current database has matched 400,000 crime scene DNA samples.72
The main reason the UK database is so large is because once a profile is entered
into the database in cannot be removed, even if the person is acquitted or the
charges dropped.73 As of 2004, any person arrested in England and Wales for any
recordable offense (regardless of their age) has their DNA taken. The profile
remains in the database permanently; the nature of the offense, the age of the
offender, and acquittal or conviction are irrelevant.74 Currently, the database

Id.
BBC News: “Time Limits on Innocent DNA Data”; BBC News; May 7, 2009;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8037042.stm
73 BBC News: “All UK Must Be On Database”; published 2007/09/05; accessed
10/01/12; from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/uk_news/6979138.stm; copyright BBC 2012
74 Id.
71
72
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contains 24,000 profiles of people aged 10-17 who were arrested and charged but
never convicted of a crime.75
The Data Protection Act of 1998
On October 24, 1995 the European Convention on Human Rights issued
Directive 95/46/EC. The Directive’s purpose was to protect the privacy of
individuals (under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) by
restricting the processing of individual personal data and limit the sharing of that
data. The Directive enumerates policies and principles to restrict the processing
and use of personal data while permitting individual Member States to enact
legislation to ensure personal data is used for the prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offenses.76
On July 16, 1998 the United Kingdom adopted the Data Protection Act to
effectuate the purpose of the Council’s Directive. The Act states that the processing
of personal data (“data which relate to a living individual who can be identified) is
subjected to eight data protection measures. The first principle requires that
personal data “shall be processed fairly and lawfully.”77 Pursuant to the Act,
personal data processed for the prevention or detection of crime is excluded from
the first principle’s requirements.78 The fifth principle of the Act orders that
personal data processed for any purpose or purposes should not be kept for longer

Id.
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/dec/echr-marper-judgment.html
77 Id.
78 Id.
75
76

18

than is necessary for that purpose. The Act makes it a criminal offense not to
comply with the protective and restrictive measures contained therein.79
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
In England and Wales, the Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 authorizes the
entry of DNA profiles of persons charged with any recordable offense or who are
convicted of any such offense.80 All DNA profiles collected from crime scenes are
also stored in the NDNAD.81 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
permitted officers to take “non-intimate” samples from suspects without permission
from the individual (for example: hair shafts).82 The Justice and Public Order Act
changed the definition of non-intimate samples to include buccal swabs, therefore
greatly expanding police sampling powers.83 The statute applies to both convicted
offenders and persons arrested or charged with an offense. Additionally, officers
are authorized to collect DNA samples from minors (who are at least 10 years old)
and from mentally ill people.84 The Act imposes no restrictions on the collection of
samples from crime scenes.85
The Criminal Justice and Police of Act of 2001 authorizes the government to
indefinitely retain the DNA profiles of both suspects and arrestees and convicted
offenders. DNA profiles of persons who are later acquitted or whose charges are

Id.
www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/dnadata/Countries/GB.html; “United
Kingdom”’ accessed 11/07/12
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
79
80
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dropped are also kept indefinitely on the database. DNA profiles generated from
samples obtained from crime scenes are stored until identified or a match is found.86
The inability of persons to remove their DNA profiles from the UK database has
sparked international criticism. Home Office Minister Tony McNulty defends the
database, stating the database has assisted police in solving about 20,000 crimes a
year.87 McNulty also said that although there are currently no plans to introduce
DNA collection and profiling for all UK citizens, “no one ever said never.”88 Lord
Justice Sedley, an experienced and respected appellate court judge in England,
publicly criticized the system, stating, “We have a situation where if you happen to
have been in the hands of the police then your DNA is on permanent record. If you
haven’t, it isn’t.”89 Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police and Chairman of the DNA
Board, Tony Lake, stated DNA profiles from those convicted or arrested for violent
or sexual offenses should stay on the database for life, but he does not think that
needs to be the process for minor offenses.90
Management of the National UK DNA Database
Beginning in 1995 the Chief Scientist of the Forensic Science Service was
responsible for management of the National DNA Database.91 In July of 2005 the
management of the database was transferred to the Home Office, who then
transferred custodianship to the National Policing Improvement Agency.92

Id.
Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
86
87
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Scotland
In Scotland, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1995 permits the entry of DNA
profiles from those individuals arrested for any recordable offense or who are
convicted of any such offense.93 DNA profiles derived from samples collected from
crime scenes are also stored in the national database.94 A police officer may request
or use reasonable force to obtain a buccal swab from any person arrested for any
recordable offense.95 Officers may also request or forcibly take samples from
minors (at least 10 years old) or from mentally ill persons.96 As in England, there
are no restrictions on collecting DNA samples from crime scenes.97 Convicted
persons’ DNA profiles are kept indefinitely on the database.98 If an arrested person
is acquitted or, as soon as the decision is made not to initiate or pursue criminal
proceedings against an arrestee, the arrestee’s sample must immediately be
removed from the database.99 Samples collected from crime scenes are retained
until identified but are not stored in the database until an identification of the
sample is made.100
Scotland’s government may develop its own policies and procedures
regarding the collection, treatment, and retention of DNA samples and profiles.
However, Scotland’s DNA database is not completely separate from England’s and

Id.
Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
93
94
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Wales’s. Scotland sends all its profiles to the NDNAD, meaning the national UK
database contains almost all of the UK profiles.101
Challenges to DNA Retention in the UK: S and Marper
The United Kingdom is a member nation of the Council of Europe and
therefore is subject to the rights granted by Section 1, Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights.102 Section 8 guarantees that 1)“Everyone has the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”, and 2)
“There shall be no interference by a pubic authority with the exercise of this right
except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”103
On August 16, 2004, two British citizens, Mr. Michael Marper, and “S”
(request made by applicant not to have his name disclosed was granted by the
court) brought two separate applications against the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland alleging violations under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.104 S had been
arrested on January 19, 2001 at the age of 11 and charged with attempted robbery.
His fingerprints and DNA sample were taken pursuant to the Police and Criminal
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Evidence Act. On June 14, 2001 S was acquitted of the crime but his DNA profile
remained on the UK national database.
Mr. Marper was arrested on March 13, 2001 and charged with harassment.
At the time of his arrest his DNA and fingerprints were taken. No charges were ever
pressed and criminal proceedings were never initiated.105 His DNA profile
remained on the database.
Both S and Marper asked for their fingerprints and DNA to be destroyed but
police refused in both cases. S and Marper applied for judicial review of the officers’
decisions not to destroy the samples. On March 22, 2012, the Administrative Court
denied the applications. S and Marper appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal,
which, on September 12, 2002, upheld the Administrative Court’s decision. Lord
Justice Walker (of the Court of Appeal) used a balancing test to determine whether
the DNA samples should be retained. He found that the risks in keeping genetic
material were outweighed by the benefits in achieving the UK’s goals of prosecuting
and preventing crime.106
On July 22, 2004 the House of Lords dismissed an appeal brought by S and
Marper. The House first noted past examples where a murderer and a rapist had
either been acquitted of charges or a decision not to proceed with criminal
proceedings had been made because DNA evidence linking the defendants to the
crimes had not been able to be used. The House went on to cite a 1999 case where
DNA evidence from “T” was used to link “T” to a rape, even though that DNA
evidence should have been destroyed (under the earlier provisions of the Police and
105
106
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Criminal Evidence Act). Additionally, the House referenced statistical evidence
where 53 murders, 33 attempted murders, 94 rapes, 38 sexual offenses, 63
aggravated burglaries and 56 cases involving drug distribution were linked to DNA
profiles that would have been destroyed under the earlier version of the Act.107
In applying the balancing test, the House of Lords concluded that the
retention of fingerprints and DNA samples did not constitute an interference with
the right to respect for private life, but that even if there was an interference it was
“modest indeed.”108 The judges noted that the modest interference was justified by
the purpose of retaining DNA profiles: the prevention of future crime and the right
of other citizens to be free from crime.109 In response to S’s and Marper’s argument
that retention of their DNA profiles on the database without a conviction “created
suspicion in respect of persons who had been acquitted”, the Home Secretary
argued that retention of DNA “had nothing to do with the past” (the offense the
person was acquitted for) but retention was to aid officers in their investigations of
future crimes.110 The applicants, and other similarly situated, would only be
impacted by the retention of their profiles if their profiles were a match for samples
found at a future crime scene. The House of Lords determined retention of DNA
profiles provided law enforcement with an enormous benefit and did not create a
privacy intrusion under Article 8.111
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S and Marper brought their case before the European Court of Human Rights’
Grand Chamber. Liberty and Privacy International, two non-governmental
organizations, filed third-party briefs detailing the private nature of genetic material
found in DNA samples. Liberty called attention to the important rights granted
under the Convention: that government interference with an individual’s rights
must be “necessary in the democratic society” and have a legitimate goal of
addressing a “pressing social need.” Furthermore, the privacy interference must be
in proportion to the goal and subject to the Court’s review and approval.112 S and
Marper focused on the personal nature of the DNA samples along with their
indefinite retention, stressing the data could be used to determine highly private
information about medical conditions. They further claimed the retention had
negative psychological implications because it exposed them to a certain negative
criminal stigma.113
The UK government argued the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
authorized the collection of the samples and retention of the profiles. The
government further alleged their activities did not fall within the purview of Article
8 because it was used only as a means of accurate identification and did not reveal
any personal information about the individuals. The government stressed the
important and legitimate goal of identifying future criminals as weighed against the
minimal intrusion of collecting the samples.114
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The 17-judge bench unanimously ruled that the retention of the DNA
samples in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland was a violation of Article 8 and
awarded 42,000 pounds each to S and Marper. The Court stressed that the
government interference with intimate details of individuals’ personal information
is of the utmost importance to the individual. The Court looked at how other
Member States dealt with DNA collection and retention, focusing on Scotland. The
Court determined that Scotland had developed a rational and proportionate method
for the DNA issue: indefinite retention for convicted individuals, destruction of
samples and profiles for those acquitted or whose charges were dropped. The
judges decided that in dealing with issues such as this, where personal and
important private information is at stake, Member States need to be given a narrow
margin in how the individual states act. In this case, the Court declared that the
United Kingdom was outside the margin and indefinite retention did not achieve the
proper balance.115
United Kingdom Reaction to S and Marper
In May of 2009 the United Kingdom Home Office issued a declaration on how
the UK would comply with the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.
According to the Court’s decision, the 850,000 DNA profiles on the database should
be removed because indefinite retention was a violation of Article 8. However,
instead of removing the profiles the Home Office announced the following
compliance measures:116
-

The destruction of all original DNA samples as soon as a profile is created
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-

After 12 years: Automatic deletion of profiles of those arrested for a
violent or sexual crime but not convicted
After six years: Automatic deletion of profiles of those arrested but not
convicted
Indefinite retention of DNA and fingerprints of anyone convicted of a
recordable offense
Removal of juvenile’s profiles who were arrested but never convicted, or
convicted of a minor offense, at the age of 18
Removal of DNA profiles for all children under 10 (already achieved at
the time of the ruling)
Approximately 850,000 profiles are affected by the ruling and it would
take up to two years to work through all the cases117

Advocacy groups for individual rights alleged the UK’s compliance plan was an
insult to the Court’s ruling that the database (excluding Scotland) was a violation of
Article 8. Government officials claimed the time limitations are enough to comply
with the ruling but fear that with the cuts fewer crimes will be solved.118 Estimates
range from 4500 fewer crimes being solved each year, with that number rising to
26,000 if the retention policies are extended to fingerprint retention, which is the
current plan.119
Vernon Coaker, Home Office minister, stated that retention of DNA is a vital tool
in solving future crimes because, according to current research, half of the
individuals arrested and convicted reoffend within six years and two-thirds
reoffend within 12 years. Because of the recidivism rates, the DNA stored on the
database is essential to matching potential samples to individuals. Jill Saward, crime
victim advocate, stated removing all the records from the database would contribute
to an “ongoing erosion of justice” in the United Kingdom.120
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Jacqui Smith, UK Home Secretary, stated the government’s proposed measures
would guarantee those should remain on the database would, while establishing a
time for removal for those who should be removed.121 Not all government officials
agreed with the government’s proposal. Chris Gayling, shadow home secretary,
stated the government should adopt the Scottish model, which had been praised by
the European Court of Human Rights. Gayling said, “People in Britain should be
innocent until proven guilty.”122 Gayling went on to allege the ministers were trying
to do as little as possible and the new measures were “just not good enough.”123
Government Democrats and liberals think DNA should be taken upon arrest but if
the person is cleared the information should not be retained at all.124 For now, the
current policies will remain in effect.

Austria
Austria established its DNA database in 1997. At the time of the 2008
Interpol survey, the database contained 32,000 crime scene profiles, 117,150
individual profiles, 103 missing person profiles, and 61 profiles from unknown or
deceased persons. The database is run by the Ministry of the Interior. In Austria,
DNA is taken only from convicted offenders and persons suspected of serious
offenses. Profiles may be deleted and samples destroyed upon acquittal, but only on
written application.125
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Belgium
In Belgium, DNA is taken without suspects’ consent when the person is
suspected of committing a crime with a prison sentence of five or more years. DNA
can also be taken without permission upon order of a magistrate, based on crime
scene evidence. DNA profiles of individuals convicted of serious offenses (mostly
rape and murder) are retained indefinitely on the database. However, all physical
DNA samples must be destroyed once profiles are obtained. At the time of the 2008
Interpol survey, the Belgium database contained 14,000 crime scene profiles and
14,000 individual profiles.126

Bulgaria
The Bulgarian DNA database was established in 1999. Police may take DNA
from suspects in criminal cases, for crime prevention, or from persons who are a
threat to national security. Profiles taken for national security reasons or crime
prevention must be erased if there is no reason for retaining the information. The
Ministry of the Interior determines whether or not a profile should be retained or
deleted. In determining retention, the Ministry considers the age of the information,
the need for the information for the completion of an ongoing investigation, whether
the person has a prior conviction, or the expiration of the term for retention as
provided by law. Profiles taken for reasons other than for crime prevention may
only be deleted upon written order of the Data Commissioner or upon a written
request from the individual. Additionally, to be deleted, the profile must have either
been registered unlawfully, the individual was acquitted, the individual is exempt
because of incapacity, or the person is deceased. At the time of the 2008 Interpol
126
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survey, the Bulgarian database contained 940 crime scene profiles, 16,100
individual profiles, and 15 profiles from unknown/deceased persons.127

Cyprus
The Cyprus DNA database was established in 1998. Cyprus has new
legislation planned, but the database is currently operating under the Police Law
and Protection of Personal Data Act. The Cyprus Police Headquarters, the
Laboratory of Forensic Genetics, and the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics
operate and maintain the DNA database. Police may only obtain a DNA sample
from a suspect upon a written court order. If the court does not issue an order then
the police need the suspect’s written permission. Convicted persons’ profiles are
retained indefinitely unless their record is expunged. Suspects’ profiles are
removed upon acquittal or upon clearance of charges. Crime scene stains are
retained until identified. In 2008, Cyprus reported to the Interpol survey 1300
crime scene profiles, 520 individual profiles, 1590 missing persons’ profiles, and five
profiles from unknown or deceased individuals.128

Denmark
Denmark created its DNA database in 2000 under the Law Establishing a
Central DNA Profile Register. Under the law, police can take samples from a
convicted person, a suspect charged with a crime that could lead to a prison term of
one and a half years or more, and all crime scene stains. After the Court’s decision in
Marper, Denmark amended its DNA retention policies. After the ruling, innocent
persons’ profiles, samples, and fingerprints may be retained for 10 years after an
127
128
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acquittal. Convicted persons’ and suspects’ profiles are retained until two years
after death or upon turning 80 years old.129

Finland
Finland established its DNA database in 1999 pursuant to the Coercive
Measures Act, the Police Act, and the Police Personal Data File Act. The law
authorizes DNA collection from persons serving a prison sentence of three or more
years, suspects charged with a crime that has a potential prison sentence of six
months or more, and all crime scene stains. Convicted persons’ profiles are retained
for 10 years after death. Suspects’ profiles are removed within one year of the
prosecutor’s determination there is no evidence, charges are dismissed, the
sentence is nullified, or 10 years after the suspect’s death (if the information was not
removed earlier). Crime scene profiles are retained indefinitely. At the time of
Interpol’s 2008 survey, Finland’s database contained 63,030 individual profiles and
9517 crime scene profiles. 130

Germany
In 1998, the German DNA database was established under the Rules of Legal
Procedure, the Act for the Establishment of Identity, and the Act for the Federal
Criminal Investigation Office. At the time of Interpol’s 2008 survey, there were
132,252 crime scene profiles, 571,250 individual profiles, 972 missing person
profiles, and 438 profiles from unknown or deceased persons on the database.131
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Pursuant to the laws, DNA is collected from people convicted of a serious
offense, people repeatedly committing the same minor offenses, suspects charged
with a serious offense, and crime scene stains related to any recordable offense.
The samples may be taken without the suspect’s consent when the sample is
necessary for an investigation and when the government has approval from a judge.
If the delay caused by waiting for a judicial order would damage the investigation,
the public prosecutor may issue the collection order. A judge may only order
coercive sampling from a convicted person when the person is convicted of a
serious or sexual offense and it is likely the person will recommit. Persons who
repeatedly commit the same offenses are treated as having committed a serious
offense. If the convicted person does not fit into the above categories, the person
needs to give consent before DNA may be taken. Under the law, police are
authorized to take samples from third party witnesses without consent if taking a
sample is deemed necessary for establishing the truth.132
Convicted persons’ and suspects’ profiles must be removed from the
database when retention is no longer necessary. German law sets time frames in
which the government must decide whether retention of profiles is necessary. For
convicted adults, the government must decide whether retention is necessary
within 10 years of sentencing; for minors, the government must decide within 5
years of sentencing. Crime scene profiles are deleted 30 years after their entry.
Unidentified profiles must be removed after 30 years as well, although most are
deleted after 10 years. Convicted persons’ and suspects’ physical samples must be
132
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destroyed when they are no longer useful for investigation. Only unidentified DNA
samples can be retained for further purposes.133

North and East Africa and the Middle East
Many countries in Northern and Eastern Africa and the Middle East have already
established DNA databases. Currently, there are active national databases in
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates.134 The policies and legislation behind the establishment of
these nations’ databases vary. For example, Israel may enact legislation to create a
DNA database for missing persons and the United Arab Emirates is attempting to
profile its entire population.
A the time of Interpol’s 2008 survey, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and
Syria had initiated plans for establishing DNA profiles. According to Gene Watch UK,
no further information is available, possibly due to last year’s unrest in these
regions.135

China
The Chinese database was established in 2004. Currently, China has the third
largest DNA database in the world, although only a small portion of the population is
profiled and stored.136 According to the 2008 Interpol survey, 126,000 crime scene
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DNA profiles, 1,065,000 individual profiles, and 9600 unknown/deceased profiles
were stored on the Chinese database. Hong Kong had its own separate database
since 200, using the US CODIS system (4,161 crime scene profiles and 16,235
individual profiles).137
The Chinese system does not operate like many of the other national databases
in the world. The Chinese government targets certain segments of the population
and then collects their DNA; DNA collection is not limited to those arrested or
convicted of criminal offenses. In August of 2009 police in southern China began
collecting and maintaining DNA records of employees working in nightclubs, bars
and KTVs. According to a report by the Yangcheng Evening News, in order to keep
their jobs, all employees in the entertainment industry would need a certificate
showing they had their DNA, fingerprints, and handwriting collected by police. Long
Shijun, deputy director of a police station in Guangzhou said the police were
collecting and marinating this information to assist in monitoring entertainment
venues, considered to be “hotbeds” of crime. Critics complained the policy proved a
longstanding prejudice against people connected with the nighttime entertainment
industry along with violating the legal principle of innocent until proven guilty.138

Canada
On December 10, 1998 the Canadian government accepted the DNA
Identification Act after years of pressure from the Canadian police community. The
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Act amended the Canadian Criminal Code to allow judges to order people convicted
of certain offenses to provide blood, buccal, or hair samples. In addition, the law
created a national DNA database where convicts’ DNA profiles, derived from the
physical samples, would be stored. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness would be responsible for establishing the database. The law went
into effect on June 30, 2000.139
The official purpose of the Act is to “establish a national DNA data bank to
help law enforcement agencies identify persons alleged to have committed
designated offenses, including those committed before the coming into force of this
Act.” The statute states that both the “protection of society and the administration
of justice are well-served by the early detection, arrest and conviction of offenders,
which can be facilitated by the use of DNA profiles.” The Act clearly stipulates that
in order to protect individuals’ privacy, DNA samples and profiles may only be used
for law enforcement purposes and that safeguards must be placed on the use of DNA
information along with access to the samples and data bank.140
Under Canadian law, the profiles of convicted persons are to be retained
indefinitely. However, the Act states that DNA samples and profiles are to be
destroyed and removed “without delay” if a person is acquitted of the offense for
which DNA was collected.141
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III. Comparison and Recommendations
Comparison of Compulsory DNA Collection
Most of the countries with DNA databases permit the compulsory collection
of DNA upon the arrest of a suspect pursuant to the national DNA laws. For
example, in the United States and United Kingdom, upon arrest law enforcement is
authorized to take a DNA sample, generate a profile, and enter the profile into that
country’s national DNA database. Germany has a slightly stricter policy: German
law requires a judicial order for a coerced sample, or, at the very least, authorization
from the local prosecutor. Canada and Italy permit DNA samples to be taken only
from convicted persons.
Compulsory DNA collection upon arrest has been most notably challenged in
the United States as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, no court to date has held the DNA
law to be unconstitutional. Even the European Court of Human Rights did not find
that the UK’s collection law violated Article 8 of the Convention for Human Rights.
Currently the United States Supreme Court is considering the
constitutionality of Maryland’s DNA collection law as applied to arrestees.142 The
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled the compulsory collection of suspects’ and
arrestees’ DNA is unconstitutional.143 Most likely, the US Supreme Court will agree
with the Circuit Courts who have addressed the constitutionality of the federal DNA
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Act, and agree that compulsory collection of DNA at the time of arrest is
constitutional and not an unreasonable search or seizure.
Opinion and Recommendations for DNA Collection Policies in the US
I do not think law enforcement should be permitted to take DNA upon arrest.
This policy bypasses the Amendment’s protections and puts innocent civilians at
risk for profiling.
First, the primary justification given for DNA collection upon arrest is
identification.144 However, as the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in the King
decision, once the suspect is identified through the routine booking and fingerprint
process, the government no longer needs the DNA for identification.145 In fact, the
court adamantly stated “solving cold cases” was the only State interest served by the
collection of King’s DNA.146 This means the DNA collection was a warrantless,
suspicionless search conducted only for the “generalized interest” in solving crime.
The United States Constitution and the Supreme Court mandate that “a warrantless,
suspicionless search cannot be upheld by a ‘generalized interest’ in solving
crimes.”147 Therefore, taking s suspect’s DNA upon his arrest when that DNA is not
needed to accurately identify him is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, compulsory collection pursuant to the federal DNA Act or state DNA
laws is not the only way for law enforcement to obtain DNA samples and profiles.
King v. State, 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012), reconsideration denied (May 18,
2012), cert. granted, 12-207, 2012 WL 3528106 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012)
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Law enforcement can obtain a special DNA search warrant to obtain a DNA sample
from a suspect.148 The search warrant requires a showing of probable cause that
the DNA sample will aid in the investigation (usually by connecting the suspect to
the crime or by eliminating the person as a suspect). The warrant requirement
upholds the values of the Fourth Amendment and ensures that law enforcement
does not bypass the Constitution.149
Congress and courts have permitted police officers and prosecutors to
bypass the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment by enacting and
upholding the compulsory collection section of the DNA Act. The probable cause
that forms the basis of the arrest is not always the same probable cause that justifies
the taking of the DNA sample.150 If officers had to obtain a DNA search warrant, they
would need to establish probable cause that DNA will link the individual to the
crime or be useful in the investigation for the crime the individual was arrested for.
For example, in King, the police did not collect King’s DNA for the assault
charge; it was collected pursuant to the Maryland law. The DNA was therefore not
collected pursuant to the probable cause of the arrest but was taken only on the
authority of the statute. The Maryland Court of Appeals stated, “Establishing
probable cause to arrest a person is not, by itself, sufficient to permit a biological
specimen to be taken from the person without first obtaining a search warrant.” I
agree. In my opinion, if police officers applied for a search warrant to obtain a DNA
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985)
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sample from King for the assault charge they would not have met the probable cause
requirement (especially since officers had already accurately identified King). The
compulsory collection laws permit law enforcement to bypass the probable cause
requirement when they collect DNA without a warrant because the probable cause
for the arrest is not the same probable cause required to take the sample.
In my opinion, the biggest problem with permitting law enforcement to
obtain a DNA sample from an arrestee without a warrant is the potential for
profiling and abuse. Under the current law, a police officer could arrest someone
who he considers “suspicious” for a minor felony offense as a pretext for obtaining a
DNA sample, with the hope of running the profile through CODIS and connecting the
arrestee to a different crime that there is no other strong evidence for. While this is
definitely efficient, it is not constitutional and runs afoul of the entire adversarial
system. Police and prosecutors are required to investigate and gather evidence
pursuant to the protections put in place by the Constitution.
I recognize that popular opinion and case law are against me. The use of
DNA for identification purposes has ensured that DNA collection upon arrest will
continue in the United States. Additionally, courts have continuously bypassed the
probable cause issue by finding that DNA profiling is only for identification, even
though other courts, such as the House of Lords in the Marper case, and the
Maryland Court of Appeals in King clearly noted stored DNA information is useful
for the prevention of future crimes.151
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Comparison of DNA Profile Retention
DNA profile retention policies vary around the world. Prior to the Marper
decision, the United Kingdom had the broadest retention policy for non-convicted
persons: DNA profiles from arrestees and suspects were retained indefinitely. The
UK began the process of changing its retention policy when the European Court of
Human Rights ruled (in Marper) the UK policy violated Article 8.
Other countries have stricter policies. Prior to Marper, Denmark had a broad
retention policy. However, after the decision, Denmark amended its policy.
Currently, innocent persons’ profiles may be retained for 10 years after their
acquittal or clearance of charges; after 10 years the records must be removed.152
Austria permits profiles to be deleted and samples to be destroyed upon acquittal if
written application is made.153 Cyprus permits convicted persons’ profiles to be
retained indefinitely but requires suspects’ profiles be removed upon acquittal or
clearance of the charges. The overall theme is that arrestees’ samples cannot be
retained indefinitely if they are never prosecuted and convicted of a crime.
The United States follows this approach. Convicted persons’ profiles are
retained indefinitely but arrestees’ profiles must be removed if charges are not
pursued or if there is an acquittal. However, in the US the cleared person is
responsible for submitting a written request that his profile be deleted along with
proof that charges were dropped or he was acquitted.
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Opinion and Recommendations for DNA Retention Policies in the US
In my opinion, in this area of DNA retention, Scotland has achieved the
correct balance. When charges are not pursued or a person is acquitted it is the
responsibility of the government to remove the arrested person’s DNA profile and
sample. This approach adequately serves law enforcement’s interest in identifying
individuals upon arrest and using DNA to investigate crimes while protecting the
privacy of innocent persons.
Convicted persons have a lesser expectation of privacy in their identity and
therefore convicted persons give up rights upon their conviction.154 Subsequently,
retaining DNA profiles of convicted persons is in line with the Fourth Amendment.
An arrestee, on the other hand, is in a different category than a convicted
person. An arrestee, through his arrest, does have a diminished expectation of
privacy in his identity than someone who is not under arrest and identification is
the main justification for taking a DNA sample upon arrest.155 Additionally, the
government has a legitimate interest in having an accurate and efficient tool (DNA)
for investigating a crime.
However, once the person is accurately identified, if charges are later
dropped or the person is acquitted of the charges, his status returns to that of a full
citizen who has every expectation of privacy in his identity. Retaining DNA profiles
of individuals when charges have been dropped or there has been an acquittal is a
clear violation of the Fourth Amendment and an intrusion into a person’s
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987); United
States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004)
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expectation of privacy in his identity. Furthermore, “the State interest in
supervision and prevention of recidivism are much diminished, if not absent, in the
context of arrestees and pretrial detainees.”156
Retaining DNA of persons who have not been convicted also violates the
presumption of innocence surrounding arrestees.157 The government interest in
storing DNA of persons who have not been convicted of a crime is not close to
sufficient to overcome this historical and traditional presumption. Retaining DNA of
an innocent persons stains that person’s presumption for any future arrest because
immediately law enforcement has access to his profile and knows he was previously
arrested.
Take Denmark as an example. Denmark’s policy of retaining innocent
persons’ profiles for 10 years after acquittal or after charges have been dropped is a
violation of the innocent person’s rights. Once the person is cleared, his life prior to
his arrest should be returned to him. Retaining his DNA profile has changed his
status under the law because now he is in a different position than a person who has
never been convicted of a crime. His arrest, which never resulted in a conviction
and could have been the result of any number of factors (mistake, illegal racial
profiling), has now, in my opinion, impermissibly affected his future and changed his
identification status. All non-convicted persons should be equal in their legal status,
but an arrestee’s status is no longer equal and the arrest follows him into his future
(10 years into his future in the case of Denmark).
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 415 n. 25 (quoting United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 874
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The United States has almost achieved the correct balance. However, I think
that requiring an innocent person to submit a written request and proof of his
innocence places too high a burden on that person. Once the person is cleared or
charges are not pursued, the burden should be on the government, who arrested,
charged, or convicted the person in the first place, to then set the record straight.
All too often a person who is less educated or more poorly represented will not be
aware that his DNA will be indefinitely retained unless he submits evidence of his
clearance or acquittal and requests the deletion of his DNA profile. This has the
potential to open the door to Due Process and Equal Protection Claims.
The bottom line is the person has been declared innocent, but because his
records are retained, he is no longer on equal footing before the law as another
innocent person has never been arrested. Arrests, without conviction, should not
alter a person’s status, disturb the presumption of innocence, and follow a person
into his future.

FINAL CONCLUSION
DNA profiling is here to stay. Using DNA for identification and investigation
in criminal matters is useful in solving crime but has serious implications on a
person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The best scenario would be to
require a search warrant based on probable cause to obtain a DNA sample. If the
person is convicted, his DNA profile should remain on the national database
indefinitely. If charges are not pursued or the person is later acquitted, the burden
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should be on the government to immediately remove the profile and destroy the
sample. This policy achieves the correct balance between the government’s
legitimate interests in identification and investigation and an individual’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
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